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NOTE
LINGLE V. NORGE DIVISION OF MAGIC CHEF,
INC.: REVOLUTIONIZING THE
APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIVE
STATE LABOR LAW TO
UNIONIZED EMPLOYEES
Congress' power to preempt state law derives from the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution.' Despite this power, Congress left much
control of labor relations to the states because labor law falls under tradi-
tional state police powers, which have generated a plethora of local regula-
tions that touch on complex labor interrelationships.2 Further, the Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act (LMRA), 3 which governs labor-
management disputes in the private sector, contains no express preemption
provision. Consequently, congressional intent determines whether certain
state action is preempted by federal law.4 Therefore, the extent to which
federal labor law preempts state labor law rests upon the courts' capacity to
glean congressional purpose from the overall labor policy manifested in the
LMRA.5
Deciphering congressional intent in this area of law led to the develop-
ment of three tests to determine whether labor preemption exists:6 the Gar-
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-1I (1824).
2. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21 (1987); Amalgamated Ass'n of
St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). "We cannot
declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex inter-
relationships between employees, employers and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the
States." Id. at 289; see also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 n.4 (1985);
Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union, Local 54, 468 U.S. 491,
503 (1984).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
4. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 208. Generally, "courts sustain a local regulation 'unless it con-
flicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the courts discern from
the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of
the States.' " Id. at 209 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
5. See Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963):
see also Lueck, 471 U.S. at 208.
6. See generally F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRI-
VATE SECTOR 37-57 (2d ed. 1986).
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mon/Sears "arguably protected/arguably prohibited" test;7 the Machinist
"arguably permitted conduct" test;8 and preemption based on section 301 of
the LMRA.9 Absent express statutory language to the contrary, only state
regulation of conduct within the scope of one of these three tests is federally
preempted.
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon 1o and Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters," the United States
Supreme Court established the following test: a state cause of action or reg-
ulation is presumed preempted if the conduct it seeks to regulate is protected
or arguably protected by section 7 of the LMRA, 2 or prohibited or arguably
prohibited by section 8 of the LMRA. 3 The Garmon decision preserved the
primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 4 rea-
soning that Congress intended that the NLRB alone should administer the
Taft-Hartley Act. Preempting state law would prevent state application of
the Act from conflicting with national labor policy.'" Nineteen years later,
the Court became concerned that Garmon preemption unnecessarily im-
pinged on state jurisdiction over conduct traditionally subject to state regula-
tion. The Court remedied this problem by refining the Garmon analysis in
Sears. 16
Lodge 76, International Association of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Commission "7 articulated the second branch of labor preemption, the
arguably permitted conduct test, which addressed Congress' concern that
7. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
8. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
427 U.S. 132 (1976).
9. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act (LMRA), § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1982).
10. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
11. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
13. Id. § 158; 436 U.S. at 187-89; 359 U.S. at 244; see also Cox, Recent Developments in
Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 277 (1980). Preemption in the labor area is
resolved by balancing the federal interests in either regulating or not regulating particular
conduct versus the legitimate interests of the states' in exercising their police powers. Id. at
287-88; see also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985). Local regulation is
sustained unless it conflicts with or frustrates federal law, or Congress sought to fully occupy
the field and exclude the states. Id.
14. 359 U.S. at 245. The United States Supreme Court held that both state and federal
judiciaries must defer to the expertise of the NLRB in the regulation of conduct arguably
protected or prohibited by § 7 or § 8 of the LMRA. Id.
15. Id.; see also Comment, Employment at-Will in the Unionized Setting, 34 CATH. U.L.
REV. 979, 991 (1985).
16. 436 U.S. 180, 188-90 (1978); Comment, supra note 15, at 992.
17. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
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states would prohibit or regulate conduct protected by federal law.' 8 The
issue in such cases is "whether 'the exercise of plenary state authority to
curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would frustrate effective implementation
[and functioning of the Labor Management Relations] Act's processes.' ,, 9
If the state's exercise of authority would prohibit or regulate conduct which
Congress intended to leave unregulated, then the state's action is
preempted.2"
Preemption based on section 301 of the LMRA, the third branch of labor
preemption, operates independently of both the Garmon/Sears and Machin-
ist preemption principles. Section 301 simply states that suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a representative labor organization may
be brought in federal district court as a federal question.21 State courts also
may enforce collective bargaining agreements but must use federal stan-
dards.22 Therefore, section 301 fosters uniformity of labor contract enforce-
ment by federal and state courts.
Uniform contract interpretation and enforcement prevents courts from
giving more than one meaning to the same contract terms in collective bar-
gaining agreements.2 3 Accordingly, states may not enforce local regulations
if effectuation of those regulations requires a state court to interpret and
apply state law to a term of a collective bargaining agreement.
Recently, state legislatures and courts have authorized contract and tort
actions for the wrongful termination of employment.24 The increase in these
state actions presented difficult section 301 preemption issues when a union-
ized employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement commenced
such a state claim for relief.25 The federal courts reacted differently, some
18. Id. at 141; see also Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n,
382 U.S. 181, 187 (1965); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89
(1960); F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 6, at 39.
19. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 147-48 (quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jackson-
ville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380 (1969)); see also Sears, 436 U.S. at 199-200 n.30 (permit-
ted conduct is to remain unregulated, subject to private ordering and controlled by the free
market); F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 6, at 39.
20. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 148.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
22. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985); Local 174, Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962).
23. See infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
24. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 6, at 51-52. Examples of such actions
include the termination of an employee in violation of state public policy, a state statute, or the
terms of an employment contract other than a collective bargaining agreement. See. e.g.. Gari-
baldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (employee who refused to
deliver spoiled dairy products discharged in violation of state public policy), cert. denied. 471
U.S. 1099 (1985).
25. See, e.g., F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 6, at 52.
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holding that the collective bargaining agreement governs exclusively,26 and
others holding that section 301 has no preemptive effect unless the state
claims allege a breach of the express terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment or otherwise require an application of state law to the collective bar-
gaining agreement.2 7 The Supreme Court recently attempted to bring
coherence to this body of preemption law.
In Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc., 28 the Supreme Court faced
the issue of whether an employee, covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment that provided the employee with a contractual remedy for discharge
without just cause, could enforce the state law remedy for retaliatory dis-
charge or whether the state law claim was section 301 preempted.29
Jonna Lingle, an employee of Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., covered
by a collective bargaining agreement, was injured in the course of her em-
ployment.3" She requested compensation for her medical expenses pursuant
to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act.3 Six days after the filing of the
claim, Magic Chef discharged Lingle for filing a "false worker's compensa-
tion claim.",32 Lingle's union filed a grievance pursuant to the collective bar-
gaining agreement that covered employees in the Herrin, Illinois,
manufacturing plant.33 The grievance proceeded through an arbitration
proceeding pursuant to the agreement, where an arbitrator ruled in Lingle's
favor and ordered her reinstated with full back pay.34
Meanwhile, Lingle also commenced a state action against Magic Chef in
the Illinois Circuit Court for Williamson County.3" She alleged that she was
discharged for exercising her rights under the Illinois Workers' Compensa-
26. See, e.g., Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp., 586 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(collective bargaining agreement exclusively governs when employee commences a state tort
action for wrongful termination of employment and federal preemption is pleaded as a
defense).
27. See, e.g., Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1371 (employer discharged employee, who refused to
deliver spoiled dairy products, in violation of state public policy despite an arbitrator's decision
that employee was fired for just cause).
28. 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
29. Id. at 1879.
30. Id.
31. Id.; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.4(h) (1987).
32. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd.
108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
33. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1879. The agreement protected all production and maintenance
employees in the Herrin plant from discharge except for "'proper" or "just" cause, and estab-
lished a procedure for the arbitration of grievances. Lingle alleged a breach of the agreement
by Magic Chef. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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tion Act.3 6 Magic Chef removed the case to the federal district court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship and then filed a motion to dismiss, claiming
section 301 preemption.37 The district court, applying the standards of A llis-
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,38 dismissed the case, holding that the claim for
retaliatory discharge was "inextricably intertwined" with the collective bar-
gaining provision39 prohibiting wrongful discharge or discharge without just
cause.4 ° The court reasoned that allowing the state cause of action would
undermine the arbitration procedures set forth in the parties' contract.4'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that
section 301 of the LMRA preempted Lingle's claim for retaliatory dis-
charge.42 Also relying on Lueck, the court concluded that Lingle's claims of
retaliatory discharge were substantially dependent upon the court's analysis
of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.43
The court refused to accept Lingle's argument that the definition of retali-
atory discharge in Illinois did not expressly require an interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement." The plaintiff argued that by analyzing the
state tort first, the court could determine that the elements of the action were
not "inextricably intertwined" with federal labor laws and would therefore
survive section 301 preemption.4" The court rejected Lingle's argument and
held that the scope of the contract (the collective bargaining agreement) re-
quired analysis first.46 The court hypothesized that if the state tort was not
section 301 preempted, then a state court would decide precisely the same
36. Id.; see Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Il. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); see also ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.4(h) (1987).
37. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1879. Alternatively, Magic Chef asked the court to stay further
proceedings pending the completion of the arbitration. Id.
38. 471 U.S. 202 (1985); see also infra text accompanying notes 108-23.
39. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (D. Ill. 1985),
aff'd, 823 F.2d 1031, 1033 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988). "Article 26.2 of
Lingle's collective bargaining agreement provided in part: [T]he right of the employer to dis-
charge or suspend an employee for just cause is recognized." 823 F.2d at 1033 n.2.
40. Lingle, 618 F. Supp. at 1449.
41. Id.
42. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1050-51; accord Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 717 F.2d
1045, 1054 (7th Cir. 1983) (exclusive administrative remedies established by the Railway La-
bor Act preempted any state court action for retaliatory discharge), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007
(1984).
43. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1046.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. "To conclude otherwise.., would allow the states ... to circumvent the arbitra-
tion and grievance procedures envisioned by Congress as exclusive." Id.; see also Allis-Chal-
mers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-11 (1985); Twitchell, Characterizing Federal Claims:
Preemption, Removal and the Arising-Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 812, 814 n.8 (1986).
19891
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issue as an arbitrator.4 7 Because "the same analysis of the facts"48 would be
implicated under both arbitration and state court proceedings, preemption of
the tort action was proper. The Supreme Court found the Seventh Circuit's
logic faulty on this point and reversed.49
Lingle presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to clarify the
scope of section 301 preemption analysis and its applicability to state causes
of action that are independent of the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement. However, the Court went beyond clarification and provided the
states with a more active role in this area of extensive federal regulation.5"
The Court unanimously took the revolutionary step of recognizing the
states' role in providing unionized employees with substantive rights, exter-
nal to the rights union employees traditionally bargained for in collective
bargaining agreements, without purportedly upsetting the traditional values
behind federal labor law preemption. 5 The Court also provided unionized
employees with a vehicle to escape the sometimes unfair results traditional
preemption analysis produced. 2 The result in Lingle may have workers
covered by collective employment contracts rejoicing because they now have
several forums available to redress grievances. Lingle is a true revolution in
an area of law that seemed committed to preemption.
This Note first discusses the procedural prerequisites for bringing a sec-
tion 301 claim. Next, it surveys the history and parameters of section 301
preemption up through the revolutionary decision in Lingle. It then focuses
on several key cases that brought the revolution to fruition and analyzes the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Lingle. Finally, this Note attempts to analyze
Lingle's impact on federal labor law preemption, address the issues resolved
by the decision, and clarify the issues that remain following the decision.
I. PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITES TO BRINGING A SECTION 301 CLAIM
The significance of the Lingle decision, which narrowed the awesome pre-
emptive force of section 301," 3 requires focusing on the procedural prerequi-
sites to bringing a section 301 suit.54 First, an action must be commenced
within the six-month statute of limitations.55 Second, pursuant to the Mad-
47. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1046.
48. Id.
49. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1883 (1988).
50. Id. at 1879; see also infra text accompanying notes 150-82.
51. See infra notes 150-82 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 57-95 and accompanying text.
53. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 (1987).
54. See Comment, supra note 15, at 998.
55. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983); LMRA
§ 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
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dox doctrine,56 employees must exhaust available grievance procedures
before seeking any other remedies. The procedural prerequisites that have
developed reflect a congressional and judicial imposition of uniformity on
the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.
A. The Preference for Arbitration: Precursor to the Maddox Doctrine
"The preference for contractual grievance-arbitration procedures in
resolving disputes is grounded in the Taft-Hartley Act."57 The grievance
procedure aids federal labor law in two ways. First, an agreement by em-
ployers to submit to grievance arbitration is the quid pro quo for the agree-
ment by employees not to strike.58 "Second, contractual arbitration
provides effective resolution of disputes over the interpretation and applica-
tion of a contract at the level those disputes are understood best, the
plant.""9 The Supreme Court sanctioned arbitration as a mechanism for dis-
pute resolution in the Steelworkers Trilogy.6" All of the issues in the Steel-
workers Trilogy involved breaches of collective bargaining agreements under
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.6'
United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 62 the first case of the
trilogy, asserted that courts should not intervene before a dispute is submit-
ted to arbitration because they are in no position to adjudge the merits of the
alleged contract violation.63 Here, the union alleged that American Manu-
facturing breached their contract by refusing to arbitrate. The company de-
fended its refusal by claiming they were not obligated to arbitrate meritless
56. See infra text accompanying notes 74-95.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d). "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the appli-
cation or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." Id.; see also Comment,
supra note 15, at 1001.
58. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
59. Comment, supra note 15, at 1002; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
60. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). These decisions were all announced the same day
and the majority opinions were all penned by Justice Douglas.
61. LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
62. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
63. Id. at 568. The case involved "an injured worker who received compensation and was
estopped in the district court from compelling the arbitration called for in his collective bar-
gaining agreement." Comment, supra note 15, at 1002; American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 566.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the grievance was baseless
and frivolous. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 1959),
rev'd, 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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grievances.64 Viewing the controversy as a simple breach of contract ques-
tion and, therefore, clearly arbitrable, 65 the Court held that a refusal to arbi-
trate is an arbitrable dispute.
The second case in the trilogy, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav-
igation Co.,66 proclaimed a presumption of arbitrability. 67 The Court deter-
mined that a dispute was arbitrable so long as the arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement was not susceptible to an interpretation that
covered the asserted grievance.68
In the last case of the trilogy, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 69 the Court precluded any further review of the merits of previ-
ously arbitrated grievances. 7' The Court reasoned that the parties to a col-
lective bargaining agreement bargained for the arbitrator's judgment, not the
'71
courts'.
The opinions in the Steelworkers Trilogy revealed the Court's desire to
maintain a uniform system of federal labor laws in conformity with what
they gleaned as the congressional intent behind the LMRA. 72 Any state law
that frustrated that goal of uniformity faced section 301 preemption. An
employee claim for breach of a collective bargaining agreement was better
handled through the process established by the same agreement that was
allegedly breached. In other words, if arbitration was the bargained for
grievance procedure within a collective bargaining agreement, adjudication
of that grievance was best left to the arbitrators.73
The preference for arbitration for resolving disputes necessarily made the
arbitrator's decisions critical to employees. Yet the extent to which an arbi-
trator's decision bound employees and employers seemed unclear.
B. The Maddox Doctrine: Requiring Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures
The Court clarified the ambiguity regarding the binding nature of arbitra-
64. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 569; Comment, supra note 15, at 1002.
65. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 569.
66. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
67. Id. at 582; Comment, supra note 15, at 1002.
68. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83. "An order to arbitrate the partic-
ular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." Id.; Comment, supra note 15, at 1002-03.
69. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
70. Id. at 598-99.
71. Id. The Court held that refusal to review the merits of arbitrated grievances will
follow so long as the arbitrator's award "draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement." Id. at 597; see Comment, supra note 15, at 1003.
72. See supra notes 53-71 and accompanying text.
73. Id.
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tors' decisions in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox.74 To achieve clarity, fed-
eral labor policy favoring private arbitration of labor disputes induced courts
to establish a requirement that employees suing under section 301 first ex-
haust their administrative remedies.75
1. Republic Steel v. Maddox
Maddox sued his employer, the Republic Steel Corporation, in state court
for failure to provide him with severance pay under the terms of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement between Republic Steel and Maddox's union.76
The collective bargaining agreement contained a three-step grievance proce-
dure followed by binding arbitration. Maddox decided to forego the griev-
ance process and directly sued his employer for breach of contract.77
The Supreme Court held that Maddox should have afforded the union the
opportunity to use the agreed upon contract procedure for redressing griev-
ances.78 The Court promulgated the general rule that unless the collective
bargaining agreement provides otherwise, employees with grievances must
attempt the use of the contractual grievance procedures before they can
bring suit against the employer.79
The Court set forth three justifications for its rationale. First, requiring
individual employees to have their claim processed by their union strength-
ens the union's position as exclusive bargaining agent.80 Second, an em-
ployer reduces the choice of remedies against it in contract disputes."'
Finally, to the extent that the grievance procedure is established as the ex-
clusive remedy, private dispute resolution is attractive and the purpose of the
Taft-Hartley Act, to promote collective bargaining, is accomplished. 2
However, what appeared as a doctrine of exhaustion, requiring thc at-
tempted use of the grievance procedures, in practice evolved into an exclu-
sivity doctrine; this made the grievance procedure in the collective
bargaining agreement an allegedly aggrieved employee's only available path
74. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
75. Id. at 652.
76. Id. at 650-52.
77. Id. at 651.
78. Id. at 652. The Court claimed that the rationale behind such a position is that an
employee cannot allege an inadequate grievance process without attempting its use. Id.; see
also Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 196 n.1 (1962).
79. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 652-53.
80. Id.; see also Comment, supra note 15, at 998.
81. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 656; Comment, supra note 15, at 998.
82. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 653; Comment, supra note 15, at 998; LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 141
(1982).
1989]
Catholic University Law Review
to recovery. 83 There were, of course, exceptions, but they were limited to a
narrow set of circumstances.84
Maddox eliminated all other avenues available to an employee that would
permit the employee to sidestep the grievance process.8" The Court rea-
soned that such sidestepping would have a twofold detrimental effect on the
desired uniformity in labor law. First, if a grievance process was not exclu-
sive, it would be less desirable as a "method of settlement., 8 6 Second, "such
a [side route] 'would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the
negotiation and administration of collective agreements.' "87 The Court rea-
soned that Maddox should have afforded the union an opportunity to act on
his behalf.8 By eliminating any other route of processing grievances, the
Court preserved the underlying policy favoring uniformity by limiting the
forums available to redress disputes.
The dissent in Maddox asserted that the Court overemphasized uniform-
ity by effectively precluding other forms of contract remedy available to ag-
grieved employees through the expansion of the applicability of section
301.89 Unless an employee could allege one of the narrow exceptions to the
Maddox doctrine,9" the arbitrator's decision would be final and binding.
83. The Steelworkers Trilogy operated to transform the exhaustion doctrine into the ex-
clusivity doctrine by implying that a grievance procedure was meant to be the exclusive means
of dispute resolution whether the collective bargaining agreement was explicit or not. See
supra text accompanying notes 57-73; see also Comment, supra note 15, at 981 n.8; Maddox,
379 U.S. at 652-53, 657-58.
84. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
85. 379 U.S. at 653.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962)).
88. Id. at 652-53.
89. Id. at 662-63 (Black, J., dissenting). This was accomplished by forcing the employee
to exhaust contract grievance procedures (e.g., arbitration) prior to attempting other forms of
redress. Justice Black, expressing dissatisfaction with the decision, wrote that the majority
holding "is the brainchild of this Court's recent consistently expressed preference for arbitra-
tion over litigation in all types of cases .... Id. Exceptions to the Maddox exclusivity doc-
trine are discussed infra note 90.
90. See Glover v. St. Louis-San Fran. Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324 (1969), which held that an
employee need not resort to the grievance procedure if such action would be futile. Here, the
union representative acted in concert with the employer to racially discriminate against blacks.
Therefore, the Court held such an action would be futile. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967), the Court said that if conduct of the employer amounts to a repudiation of contract
procedures, an employer is precluded from asserting unexhausted agreement procedures as a
defense to the suit. As Vaca highlights:
Contractual remedies have been devised and are often controlled by the union and
the employer, [therefore] they may well prove unsatisfactory or unworkable for the
individual grievant. The problem then is to determine under what circumstances the
individual employee may obtain judicial review of his breach-of-contract claim de-
spite his failure to secure relief through the contractual remedial procedures.
[Vol. 38:769
Lingle v. Norge Division
2. Maddox Applied
Maddox placed an aggrieved unionized employee in a very poor position if
he attempted to recover for union or employer contractual violations. First,
if an employee did not attempt to use the grievance procedure provided for
in the collective bargaining agreement, the Maddox exclusivity rule pre-
cluded a subsequent section 301 suit.9' Second, if the employee used the
procedure and received either an arbitration decision or a union decision not
to proceed to arbitration, the Court's stated preference for arbitration also
precluded a section 301 suit.92 Third, if the employee attempted to bring
suit against the employer and failed to allege either a breach of the union's
duty of fair representation, a breach of contract by the employer, or futility
of contractual remedy,9 3 the employee was forced to abandon the suit and
proceed through the established contract grievance procedure. 94
Stated simply, the Court preferred arbitration over judicial determination
as the method of redress for employment contract disputes. The result,
which found its genesis in the concept of uniformity as the central value of
labor law, proved hazardous for unionized employees because the Court lim-
ited employees' avenues of grievance redress. Thus, while adherence to arbi-
tration clauses did serve to achieve the Court's desired uniformity, rights
that states guaranteed their employees were subordinated to the lofty goal of
a uniform labor policy.
Maddox, therefore, posed significant dispute resolution problems for em-
ployees covered by collective bargaining agreements because nearly all such
agreements designated arbitrators as the adjudicators of contract disputes.95
Id. at 185. Exhaustion of the contractual remedies is not required where (1) the conduct of the
employer amounts to a repudiation of the contract, id.; (2) the union has wrongfully refused to
process a grievance, id.; or (3) exhaustion of contractual remedies would be futile, Glover, 393
U.S. at 330. See also Macon v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 698 F.2d 858, 860 (7th Cir.
1983) (discussing exceptions to Maddox exhaustion doctrine).
91. See generally supra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 72-90 and accompanying text. The doctrine of exclusivity of contrac-
tual remedies applies whether or not a grievance is processed through the arbitration stage.
See Hinds v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976) (arbitration decision is
exclusive remedy absent breach of the duty of fair representation); Macon v. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., 698 F.2d at 860 (plaintiff-employee's suit dismissed because it was filed
when grievance was pending before arbitration); Harp v. Kroger Co., 489 F.2d 1104, 1105 (6th
Cir. 1974) (suit dismissed when plaintiff-employee failed to pursue available grievance proce-
dures and union declined to process grievance). See generally F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY,
supra note 6, at 395-418.
93. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 185, 190; Glover, 393 U.S. at 330.
94. See generally supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987)
(Court upheld arbitrator's determination that employee found with marijuana traces in car on
company lot did not violate the company's policy regarding use or possession of marijuana on
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Notwithstanding the limited set of exceptions, an overwhelming number of
unionized employees were required to assert their rights in a nonjudicial fo-
rum for the sake of uniform application of the terms of their collective bar-
gaining agreements. Moreover, judicial interpretation of the preemptive
breadth of section 301 has prevented unionized employees from enjoying the
work-related rights bestowed upon them by state law.
II. SURVEYING THE PREEMPTIVE SCOPE OF SECTION 301
In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,9 6 the Supreme Court outlined the his-
tory of the preemptive scope of section 301. 9" The Court highlighted that
the decisions of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills98 and Local 174,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. 99 gave meaning to the plain language of section
301.
A. Lincoln Mills and Lucas Flour
Despite its plain language, section 301 is more than merely a jurisdictional
statute, as evidenced in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills."° There,
the Court asserted that section 301 did more than simply confer jurisdiction
on federal courts to hear suits regarding alleged violations of collective bar-
company property); Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) Bull. No. 1140, § 51:5, at 25
(Feb. 9, 1989) ("Arbitration is called for in 98 percent of the sample contracts - 99 percent in
manufacturing and 96 percent in non-manufacturing."); see also Comment, supra note 15, at
1004.
[T]he practical effect of this Maddox-Steelworkers axis is that a union member wish-
ing to sue for breach of his collective bargaining agreement must exhaust the agree-
ment's arbitration procedure. Once the arbitration procedure has run its course....
the court will defer to that arbitration decision and will not allow suit to proceed
under the Steelworkers Trilogy rationale. After exhaustion of such grievance proce-
dure, a subsequent section 301 suit will be dismissed because of Maddox exclusivity
principles.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
96. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
97. Id. at 209. Section 301(a) of the LMRA states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). Congress did not state explicitly whether and to what extent it
intended § 301 to preempt state law. As a result, § 301's meaning comes from judicial inter-
pretation. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 208-09.
98. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
99. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
100. 353 U.S. at 450-51 (interpreted § 301 as a congressional mandate to the federal courts
to fashion a body of federal common law that would be used in addressing disputes arising out
of labor contracts); Lueck, 471 U.S. at 209.
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gaining agreements.'' Through section 301, the Court reasoned, Congress
had authorized federal courts to create a body of federal law for the enforce-
ment of collective bargaining agreements.'o 2 Five years later, the Court de-
termined in Charles Dowd Box Co., v. Courtney that state courts could
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over section 301 claims so long as the state
courts applied federal law. 1
0 3
The Supreme Court analyzed the preemptive effect of section 301 in Local
174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. 'o The Court, faced with the dilemma of
applying conflicting local and federal law regarding the interpretation of a
no-strike clause, expressly held that federal law, not state law, must govern
adjudication of section 301 claims.'o 5 In so holding, the Court attempted to
further the policy of uniform interpretation of labor statutes. 10 6 The Court
concluded that federal law must control when defining the terms in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. It reasoned that federal law prevails over state
law in order to minimize inconsistent interpretation of the terms of a labor
contract. '
0 7
The Supreme Court attempted to ensure uniformity of interpretation of
labor agreements while still reserving for the states their right to apply and
enforce their various police powers. In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 1o8 the
Court devised a test which limited the preemptive effect of section 301.
101. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 450-51.
102. Id.
103. 368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962). "[The Court] in Dowd Box proceeded upon the hypothesis
that state courts would apply federal law in exercising jurisdiction over litigation within the
purview of § 301(a) claims." Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 102 (discussing Dowd Box, 368 U.S. at
502).
104. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
105. Id. at 102; see also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 856
(1987).
106. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103-04.
The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under
state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the
negotiation and administration of collective agreements. Because neither party could
be certain of the rights which it had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating
an agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by the necessity of trying
to formulate contract provisions in such a way as to contain the same meaning under
two or more systems of law which might someday be invoked in enforcing the con-
tract. Once the collective bargain was made, the possibility of conflicting substantive
interpretation under competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong
disputes as to its interpretation.
Id.
167. Id.
108. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
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B. Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck: The Parameters of Section 301 Preemption
Lueck and Allis-Chalmers were parties to a collective bargaining agree-
ment containing a disability grievance procedure that culminated in final
and binding arbitration." 9 Lueck suffered a nonoccupational injury, noti-
fied Allis-Chalmers as required, and filed a disability claim with Aetna Life
and Casualty Company, the administrators of the negotiated group health
and disability plan funded by Allis-Chalmers." ' Aetna approved Lueck's
claim and he began receiving disability benefits."'
In the ensuing months, according to Lueck, Allis-Chalmers periodically
ordered Aetna to terminate Lueck's payments.1 12 After each termination,
Aetna restored the payments for a variety of reasons." 3 Rather than utilize
the grievance procedure, Lueck initiated a suit in Wisconsin state court al-
leging the tort of bad-faith handling of an insurance claim.
114
The United States Supreme Court held that the state court should have
dismissed Lueck's claim either for failure to make use of the grievance pro-
cedure" 5 or as preempted by section 301.116 The Court concluded that the
right asserted by Lueck was rooted in the employment contract" 7 and,
under Wisconsin law, the parties' own contract of insurance supplies the
scope of the duty of good-faith handling of insurance claims."' A breach of
that duty, therefore, depended on an interpretation of that contract.' 1 In
Lueck, Allis-Chalmers was self insured. 12' The collective bargaining agree-
109. Id. at 204.
110. Id. at 205.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. Lueck, after each termination, would question the action or supply additional
information, thus having the benefits restored. Id.
114. Id. Lueck alleged that as a result of these bad-faith actions, he incurred debts, emo-
tional distress, physical impairment, and pain and suffering. Id. at 206. The Wisconsin trial
court ruled in Allis-Chalmers' favor, holding that Lueck's claim was preempted as stating a
claim under § 301. Id. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, in an unpublished decision, agreed
with the trial court that federal law preempted the claim against Allis-Chalmers. Lueck v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 82-1041 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
reversed. Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 342 N.W.2d 699 (1984). It held that
the suit was neither § 301 preempted nor preempted under the Garmon/Sears § 7 and § 8
analysis. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 207. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 469
U.S. 815 (1984), to determine whether § 301 "preempts a state-law tort action for bad-faith
delay in making disability payments due under a collective-bargaining agreement." Lueck,
471 U.S. at 208.
115. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 221; see also supra text accompanying notes 57-73.
116. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 221.
117. Id. at 220.
118. Id. at 217.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 204.
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ment governed the insurance coverage of disability claims. 12' Accordingly,
"[u]nless federal law governed that claim, the meaning of the health and
disability-benefit provision of the collective bargaining agreement would be
subject to varying interpretations, and the congressional goal of a unified
body of labor contract law would be subverted."' 22
The Lueck Court articulated the following test of section 301 preemption:
if the state action is "inextricably intertwined" with consideration of the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the law on which the plaintiff
based that action is preempted. 123 Preemption applies to a state law which
purports to define the meaning of the contract relationship.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Lueck left unresolved the scope of section
301 preemption when an employee claims abridgement of state-created
rights and obligations not evidently dependent on an interpretation of the
labor contract, but the labor contract offers substantially equivalent redress
of the harm alleged in the state court claim. 124
C. Post-Lueck - Pre-Lingle: The Struggle to Clarify
"Inextricably Intertwined"
Following Lueck, the Supreme Court, as well as the circuit courts, at-
tempted to determine which state laws and regulations were not "inextrica-
bly intertwined" with the terms of collective bargaining agreements among
employees, unions and employers and which would permit a state court ac-
tion to proceed. The struggle surfaced most often when courts could not
ascertain which state-created rights were actually dependent upon the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement for resolution.
1. The Circuit Courts Conflict
The circuit courts found little guidance in Lueck's "inextricably inter-
twined" test when they tried to distinguish between collective bargaining
agreement rights and state-created rights in retaliatory discharge suits. For
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit strug-
gled with the definition of "inextricably intertwined" in Johnson v. Huss-
mann Corp. 125 Johnson, an employee of Hussmann Corporation, suffered a
work related injury, and filed a state workers' compensation claim.' 26 Soon
thereafter, he was discharged for alleged repeated violations of posted safety
121. Id.
122. Id. at 220.
123. Id. at 213.
124. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 6, at 55.
125. 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1986).
126. Id. at 796.
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rules.127 Johnson then protested his discharge and his union filed a griev-
ance, but, following the employer's denial of the grievance, the union de-
cided not to proceed to arbitration. 12' Eight months later, Johnson filed a
complaint in state court against Hussmann for retaliatory discharge. 2 9 The
Missouri district court held the claim for retaliatory discharge preempted on
Lueck grounds, applied the six-month statute of limitations to the cause of
action,13° and dismissed the claim as time barred. The court of appeals af-
firmed, holding that the claim was preempted because resolution of the claim
was substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.13'
Simultaneously, other circuits addressed the issue with conflicting results.
In Herring v. Prince Macaroni of New Jersey, Inc., 132 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that section 301 did not preempt the
retaliatory discharge claims.133 The Herring court concluded that workers'
compensation rights were rooted in state law, rather than the collective bar-
gaining agreement and, accordingly, the state cause of action in question was
an essential element of the state's workers' compensation scheme and not
preempted. 134
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. Johnson's complaint against Hussmann and Local 9014, United Steelworkers, al-
leged conspiracy, breach of contract, breach of fair duty of representation by the union (a
hybrid § 301 fair representation claim), and retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compen-
sation claim. Id.
130. Id.; DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 155 (1983) (set
forth six-month statute of limitations for § 301 claims); NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)
(1982).
131. Johnson, 805 F.2d at 797. The court reasoned that although Johnson brought the
state action for retaliatory discharge in tort rather than contract, and omitted the union as a
defendant, he was "'in fact suing the employer for wrongful discharge in violation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement." Id.; see also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219-20
(1985); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511, 516-18 (7th Cir. 1985) (state tort
claim for retaliatory discharge for filing workers' compensation claim preempted by federal
labor law); Bell v. Gas Serv. Co., 778 F.2d 512, 516-18 (8th Cir. 1985) (employee's claim of
employer's fraudulent misrepresentation preempted by federal labor law).
132. 799 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986) (employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement
discharged after filing for and receiving workers' compensation benefits following work-related
injury).
133. Id. at 123-24, 124 n.2.
134. Id. at 124 n.2; see also Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., United Technolo-
gies Corp., 814 F.2d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 1987) (claim of wrongful discharge in retaliation for
filing workers' compensation claim not preempted), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2819 (1988).
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2 The United States Supreme Court Attempted to Resolve the Issues
Remaining After Lueck
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve the open issues of Lueck in In-
ternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Hechler, ' and Caterpillar,
Inc. v. Williams. 136 Yet, the lower courts did not adhere to the reasoning in
these cases, but instead, repeatedly distinguished them on factual grounds.
In Hechler, an employee sued her union for breach of its duty of care to
provide a union member with a safe workplace.' 37 The Court held that sec-
tion 301 preempted such a state claim because, in Florida, the union's duty
of care with respect to workplace safety, if any, arose as a result of the
union's participation in the collective bargaining agreement. 138 Thus, the
collective bargaining agreement governed the union's responsibility to Hech-
ler.139 A separate state action could not be maintained because the action
would require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.' 4 0
The Court decided Caterpillar .4 on similar grounds. Caterpillar origi-
nally employed Williams and other employees in positions inside bargaining
units covered by collective agreements. 14 2 The employees eventually held
positions outside the bargaining unit as management or weekly salaried em-
ployees for extended time periods. 4 3 While in these latter positions, the
employees alleged that Caterpillar repeatedly assured them new employment
if their specific facility ever closed.'4 4 When the facility closed, respondents
were laid off.'4 5 The respondents sued in state court for breach of their indi-
vidual employment contracts. 146 The Supreme Court held that the cause of
action for breach of an individual employment contract was not preempted
by section 301 because the claim did not rely in any way on the collective
bargaining agreement. 147 Therefore, Williams' state claim was not remova-
ble to federal court.'4 8 The Court reaffirmed that it would be inconsistent
135. 481 U.S. 851 (1987).
136. 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
137. 481 U.S. at 853.
138. Id. at 861-62.
139. Id. at 862.
140. Id. at 861-62.
141. 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
142. Id. at 388. A bargaining unit is a particular group of employees with a similar com-
munity of interests appropriate for collective bargaining. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 136
(5th ed. 1979).
143. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 388.
144. Id. at 388-89.
145. Id. at 389.
146. Id. at 390.
147. Id. at 394-96.
148. Id. at 398.
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with congressional intent under section 301 if the Court was to preempt state
rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent
of a labor contract.1
49
Thus, although Lueck appeared to have developed a clearly drawn section
301 preemption test, a proper application of the test apparently escaped
some of the lower courts. Not until Lingle did the Supreme Court address
the preemption issue in the context of rights provided by a state statute and a
collective bargaining agreement. In Lingle, the Court tried to resolve the
conflict between the circuits on the issue of whether section 301 preempted
state causes of action which provided a remedy independent of a collective
bargaining agreement. 150
III. LINGLE V. MAGIC CHEF: THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
In order to fill the interstices left by Lueck, the Supreme Court decided
that the crucial inquiry for determining whether a state claim or cause of
action is preempted is whether the elements of the claim can be examined
without reliance upon any of the provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment between an employee and employer.151 In Lingle v. Norge Division of
Magic Chef Inc., the Court, after reviewing the history of section 301, ana-
lyzed the elements of the Illinois tort of retaliatory discharge for the filing of
a workers' compensation claim.152
The courts in Illinois recognize the tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a
149. Id. at 395; Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212 (1985). "[I]t would be
inconsistent with congressional intent under [§ 301] to pre-empt state rules that proscribe con-
duct, or establish rights and obligations independent of a labor contract." Caterpillar, 482 U.S.
at 395 (quoting Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212).
150. The federal circuit decisions on the issue were inconsistent. Compare Baldracchi v.
Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., United Technologies Corp., 814 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987) (no
preemption), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2819 (1988) and Herring v. Prince Macaroni of New
Jersey, Inc., 799 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986) (same) and Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309
(10th Cir. 1981) (no preemption, pre-Lueck) with Johnson v. Hussmann Corp., 805 F.2d 795
(8th Cir. 1986) (preemption) and Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir.
1985) (same).
151. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1882 (1988). The case
history is discussed supra text accompanying notes 30-49.
152. 108 S. Ct. at 1881-83.
[T]o show retaliatory discharge, the plaintiff must set forth sufficient facts from
which it can be inferred that (1) he was discharged or threatened with discharge and
(2) the employer's motive in discharging or threatening to discharge him was to deter
him from exercising his rights under the [workers' compensation] Act or to interfere
with his exercise of those rights.
Id. at 1882; Horton v. Miller Chem. Co., 776 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1985) (summarizing
Illinois state court decisions), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986); Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1882.
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workers' compensation claim.'" 3 The tort applies to union as well as nonun-
ion employees.' 54 The elements for establishing a retaliatory discharge
claim"55 in Illinois are purely factual questions pertaining to employee and
employer conduct and the motivations behind the employer's conduct.'
5 6
The Supreme Court held that neither element required the state courts to
interpret any term of the collective bargaining agreement.' 57 Moreover, an
employer, in defense of a claim, must only demonstrate nonretaliatory rea-
sons for the discharge, which also requires no agreement interpretation. 5
8
Therefore, the Court determined that the state law remedy in Lingle was
"independent" of the collective bargaining agreement in the sense that reso-
lution of the state law claim did not require construing the collective bar-
gaining agreement. "' This is the only independence that matters for section
301 preemption purposes. The Court contended that the independence in
Lingle was not present in either Lucas Flour, Lueck, or Hechler. 60 In those
cases, the pertinent principles of state law required construing the relevant
collective bargaining agreement.1 6'
The unanimous Lingle Court next clarified the reasoning behind section
301 preemption analysis.' 62 An employee's right to be free from retaliatory
discharge is a nonnegotiable right and applies to both unionized and non-
unionized employees.' 6 3 The terms of a collective bargaining agreement
cannot alter that right.'64 The Court reasoned that most state laws that are
153. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 I11. 2d 172, 181-82, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (1978); see also
Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1881. Recognition of the tort for retaliatory discharge for filing a workers'
compensation claim was first substantiated in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind.
249, 253, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973) (retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation
claim held to violate public policy). For development of the cause of action in other states, see
generally Annotation, Recovery for Discharge from Employment in Retaliation for Filing Work-
ers' Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R. 4th 1221 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
154. Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 I11. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985).
155. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1882.
156. Id.
157. Id.; see supra note 152.
158. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1882; cf Loyola Univ. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 149
I11. App. 3d 8, 500 N.E.2d 639 (1986) (black employee, discharged in retaliation for charges of
employer racial discrimination and civil rights violations, reinstated with back pay and attor-
ney's fees by proving that employer's nonretaliatory reasons were pretextual).
159. 108 S. Ct. at 1882.
160. Id. at 1882 n.7; International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987);
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95 (1962).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 104-24 and 135-40.
162. 108 S. Ct. at 1882.
163. Id. at 1882 n.7.
164. Id.
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not preempted by section 301 will grant nonnegotiable rights shared by all
state workers.1 65 Conversely, the Court asserted, it was conceivable that a
nonnegotiable state remedy could be created that still required interpretation
of a collective bargaining agreement for its application and, therefore, would
be preempted. 166 Furthermore, if a law covered only unionized workers but
resolution of the claim did not require interpretation of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, the claim would remain unpreempted. 167 Thus, the
Court held that an application of state law is preempted by section 301 only
if such application requires the interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement.168 A collective bargaining agreement interpretation is necessary
only if the elements for establishing the state cause of action implicate any
term of the agreement. 
169
The Court next eliminated the "same analysis of the facts" test previously
used by the circuit courts in analyzing the preemption issue. .70 This section
301 preemption determination hinged upon whether a state court judge
would analyze the same facts that an arbitrator would in an arbitration pro-
ceeding. 17i The Seventh Circuit disposed of Lingle's claim under this analy-
sis. 172 The Supreme Court posited that the parallelism between the analysis
of the state court judge and that of the arbitrator was irrelevant.17 3 Even if
dispute resolution pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement or resolu-
tion of a state law claim addressed precisely the same factual situation, the
claim was independent of the agreement for section 301 preemption pur-
poses provided the state law claim could be resolved without interpreting
any term of the collective bargaining agreement. ' 74 The Supreme Court but-
tressed its rationale with policy considerations. 17  For example, the Court
reaffirmed that collective bargaining agreement interpretation remains firmly
in the arbitral realm and that judges may determine state law labor-manage-
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1885.
169. Id. at 1882.
170. Id. at 1883; see, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031, 1046
(7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
171. See Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1046.
172. Id.
173. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1883 (1988).
174. Id.; see also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (section 301 governs
claims founded directly on rights created by a collective bargaining agreement and claims
substantially dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement); International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 n.3 (1987).
175. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1884.
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ment relations' questions only if those questions do not involve judges inter-
preting or construing the agreements.' 76
Allowing state tort actions that do not require interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements to proceed in state courts preserved the effectiveness
of arbitration because the Court's holding left the fundamental tenet, that
arbitrators interpret collective bargaining agreements, intact. 177 In addition,
the Court opined that the recognition of substantive rights in a labor rela-
tions context could exist without interpreting an employee-employer agree-
ment; this was not novel. 178 In the past, the Court had refused to hold that
an employee's claims under federal statutes were disallowed simply because
arbitration was available. 179 Based on this reasoning, and despite the strong
policies encouraging arbitration, the Lingle Court held that where an em-
ployee's claim is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide
minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers, guaranteeing those
rights is a stronger concern than the policies behind arbitration. 8 °
Lingle accomplished two seemingly conflicting ends. It empowered states
to establish minimum protection laws for its workers, a field previously regu-
lated exclusively at the federal level, 18' while reaffirming the traditional val-
ues underlying preemption. On the one hand, Lingle recognized that,
despite traditional federal regulation, state minimum protection laws for
workers create causes of action which can survive a preemption challenge if
the laws are sufficiently independent of the applicable collective bargaining
agreement. On the other hand, the decision preserved the preference for
arbitration, one of the central reasons supporting the Lucas Flour deci-
sion, "82 and still maintained one of the fundamental tenets of labor law-
that only arbitrators interpret collective bargaining agreements.
176. Id.
177. Id.; see also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219 (1985); Local 174,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962).
178. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1884.
179. Id.; see, e.g., McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
180. 108 S. Ct. at 1884; Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737
(1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
181. An example of an exception to the rule that state judges cannot interpret the collective
bargaining agreement arises if the agreement is interpreted by a state judge only to determine
information for damages. The state law, not otherwise preemptive, would remain so. See
Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211 ("not every dispute ... tangentially involving a provision of a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement[ ] is preempted by § 301 .... "); see also Baldracchi v. Pratt &
Whitney Aircraft Div., United Technologies Corp., 814 F.2d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2819 (1988); Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1885 n.12.
182. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1884; see also Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S.
95, 104 (1962).
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF LINGLE ON FEDERAL LABOR LAW PREEMPTION
The Lingle decision reinforced the general values behind federal labor law
preemption: uniformity, 183 preservation of the effectiveness of arbitra-
tion, 184 and the need for arbitrators to interpret collective bargaining agree-
ments.' 85 The Lingle decision also raised several new issues regarding state
law causes of action available to unionized employees. These new issues
raise questions regarding the effects of Lingle on the Maddox doctrine and
on employer-union relations when bargaining collectively; the significance of
unionized employees now having two potential avenues for redressing em-
ployment claims; and, finally, whether Lingle is a step toward the deregula-
tion of labor law.
A. Lingle and Maddox. Employees' Two Avenues of Redress
Lingle alleviated some of the unfair effects of the Maddox doctrine. Col-
lective bargaining agreements often incorporate the same basic employment
rights that states provide. Maddox required an employee alleging violation
of those rights to use the grievance procedure in the agreement.' 86 If this
procedure was followed and the employee either received a final arbitration
decision or the union decided not to process the grievance, then Maddox
effectively precluded any further redress.187 Because the unionized em-
ployee could not seek further redress beyond the arbitration process and
nonunionized employees could file a state court claim, the unionized em-
ployee received less state law protection than the nonunionized employee as
a result of the collective bargaining agreement.188
Lingle eliminated that result. If an employee's rights are rooted in state
law, the employee now has the option to file a grievance, a state claim, or
both.' 89 However, if the employee's rights are rooted in the bargained-for
agreement, the employee is limited to the bargained-for relief prescribed in
the agreement. Lingle thus protects employees against the abuse of the
Maddox exclusivity principles by both employers and unions. A right
rooted in a state statute cannot be bargained away.' 90 Moreover, the parties
183. See supra text accompanying notes 74-95.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 57-95.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 96-124.
186. See 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965); see also supra text accompanying notes 74-95.
187. See supra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
188. See Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., United Technologies Corp., 814
F.2d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 1987) (prima facie elements of retaliatory discharge in Connecticut do
not require interpretation of the "just cause" provision in collective bargaining agreement),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2819 (1988).
189. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1882 (1988).
190. See, e.g., Baldracchi, 814 F.2d at 105.
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to a collective bargaining agreement do not have the right, under section
301, to contract for that which is illegal under state law.' 9 ' Therefore, even
if the collective bargaining agreement permitted Magic Chef to discharge
Lingle for filing a workers' compensation claim, that provision would have
no effect on Lingle's claim under the state statute. The state statutory rights
are not dependent upon the collective bargaining agreement and do not re-
quire interpretation of that agreement.' 92
An interpretation that section 301 was meant to provide unionized work-
ers with less state law protection than nonunionized workers, in the interest
of uniform federal labor law, is inconsistent with congressional intent in en-
acting the LMRA. In a similar circumstance, the Supreme Court held, "[i]t
would turn the policy that animated the Wagner Act on its head to under-
stand it to have penalized workers who have chosen to join a union by
preventing them from benefiting from state labor regulations imposing mini-
mal standards on nonunion employers." 193 Therefore, Lingle assures union-
ized employees that simply because a collective bargaining agreement
provides the same rights as state minimum protection laws, unionized em-
ployees will not be penalized by being denied access to the state courts. 194 If
an employer is alleged to have violated an employee's right which is rooted
in state law, as well as the contract agreement, the employee has the option
of either form of redress. Simply stated, contractual protection is an extra
benefit derived from exercising one's freedom of association rights by becom-
ing a member of a union.
B. Does Lingle Serve as a Disincentive to Employers
to Accept Arbitration Agreements?
Assume the Supreme Court rarely decides a case in which two polar oppo-
sites, union representatives and employers, disagree with the decision for
similar reasons. Unions and employers may fear that Lingle will adversely
affect trade unionism because the decision will ultimately serve as a disincen-
tive to employers to readily accept arbitration agreements. 195 Unions sus-
191. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212 (1985).
192. Cf Baldracchi, 814 F.2d at 105 (Connecticut retaliatory discharge elements are not
dependent on the collective bargaining agreement).
193. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985); Baldracchi,
814 F.2d at 107.
194. See generally Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988); see
also supra text accompanying notes 151-82.
195. See Klare, Workplace Democracy and Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal
Reform, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 58-62 (1988); Herman, Wrongful Discharge Actions After
Lueck and Metropolitan Life Insurance: The Erosion of Individual Rights and Collective
Strength? 9 INDUS. REL. L.J. 596 (1987); see, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,
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pect that an employer will no longer be willing to forfeit certain rights in
collective bargaining if the arbitration procedure can still leave the employer
vulnerable to state suits. 196
This concern is groundless. Considerable incentives to entertain arbitra-
tion agreements continue after Lingle. If an employer has a collective bar-
gaining agreement that does not provide for arbitration, then nothing
prevents employees from suing an employer in state court to enforce state
statutory or common law rights, or in federal court to enforce contractual
rights. However, under a collective bargaining agreement that contains a
grievance arbitration clause, contract claim procedural prerequisites 9 7 must
be met to preserve a claim. As noted above, to enforce a right rooted in the
collective bargaining agreement having an arbitration clause, the employee
must initiate grievance proceedings through the channels established by the
agreement.198 Even if the union declines to process a member's grievance, it
is a binding decision.' 99 The employer incurs no attorney's fees, suffers no
discovery, and avoids the burdens associated with litigation. Therefore, an
employer suffers no disincentive to negotiate or accept a collective agreement
with arbitration channels as a result of Lingle.
To be sure, an employer violating an employee's right rooted in state law
is exposed to a state action." Therefore, if a state has promulgated protec-
tive legislation, Lingle enhances the possibility of increased state litigation in
the employment realm. However, comparing the amount of litigation a un-
ionized employer may be subjected to as a party to a collective bargaining
agreement without an arbitration clause, to the lesser amount of litigation a
unionized employer with an arbitration clause faces, it is fairly obvious that
Lingle does not serve as a disincentive to employers to accept arbitration
agreements. In addition, employees may see an incentive to pursue litigation
in state courts because state claims provide for recovery of compensatory
and punitive damages, as opposed to reinstatement and recovery of back pay
through arbitration.
823 F.2d 1031, 1047 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that failure to preempt state retaliatory discharge claims
would be detrimental to unions. The court reasoned that if workers were protected from
wrongful and unjust discharges by state statute or common law, the benefits of analogous
protection from unions eviscerates, thus leaving unions without a major recruiting tenet. See
also supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text. But see Wheeler & Browne, Federal Preemp-
tion of State Wrongful Discharge Actions, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1 (1986).
196. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1047; see supra sources cited note 195.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 53-73.
198. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); Republic Steel Corp. v. Mad-
dox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95.
200. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1884 (1988).
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C. Is Lingle Another Step Toward Deregulation?
Lingle presents another development in labor law which conflicts with the
values that underlie federal labor law. The Supreme Court, in Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne,"z' held that preemption should not be lightly inferred
in the area of state substantive labor law because "the establishment of labor
standards falls within the traditional police power of the State."' 20 2 Lingle
reinforced that message by allowing unionized employees two avenues of
redress. In an area of law that has been federally regulated for the last half
century, the Court has begun to retreat from preempting state actions within
the labor realm, and has become more selective when asserting preemption
power.
The reasons for this change are speculative. Perhaps the Supreme Court
is inviting the states to more actively determine labor rights by sending the
eighteen million Americans covered by labor contracts into state courts. Of
course, the more workplace rights state or federal statutes provide to all
workers, the less apparent the need becomes to seek union representation.
However, federal preemption is still a viable doctrine as evidenced by the
Lingle Court's declaration that its decision was consistent both with the pol-
icy of fostering uniform and certain adjudication of disputes over the inter-
pretation of collective bargaining agreements, and with cases that have
permitted separate fonts of substantive rights to remain unpreempted by
other federal labor law statutes.20 3 Any other motivations must await the
judgment of history. All things considered, a politically conservative Court
weighed two values, uniformity in federal labor law and federalism. By call-
ing the states to a more active role, the Court seemingly came down on the
side of federalism.
V. CONCLUSION
With the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act more than four decades ago,
Congress gave the federal judiciary the power to establish the extent to
which federal labor law preempts state labor law. The federal courts decided
that uniform interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments was one of the fundamental tenets upon which they would build their
preemption guidelines. To establish the desired uniformity, the federal
201. 482 U.S. 1 (1987) (Maine law establishing minimum labor standards does not imper-
missibly intrude upon the collective bargaining process and, therefore, is not preempted by
LMRA).
202. Id. at 21.
203. 108 S. Ct. at 1884.
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courts preempted state labor regulations that conflicted with federal labor
laws regarding contract enforcement and interpretation.
Moreover, the courts sanctioned private arbitration as the preferred dis-
pute resolution mechanism. As a result, employees that engaged in contract
disputes with employers were relegated to the arbitration machinery found
in their collective bargaining agreements, and were also effectively precluded
from state tribunal protection.
Recently, state legislatures and courts have authorized state contract and
tort actions for alleged wrongful termination of employment. As these ac-
tions increased, so did the degree of difficulty in ascertaining whether such
actions were section 301 preempted when a unionized employee, covered by
a collective bargaining agreement that called for arbitration, commenced a
state action for wrongful termination.
The Supreme Court in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef Inc. held
that if state court judges do not interpret any term of the collective bargain-
ing agreement when adjudicating state claims, then section 301 preemption
principles do not apply. The Court reasoned that such state actions are in-
apposite to the objective of minimizing inconsistent contract interpretation.
Therefore, independent state contract and tort actions do not interfere with
the fundamental goal of uniform contract interpretation and enforcement.
Lingle represents a significant shift in the development of labor law. The
decision provides employees, who are covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments providing for arbitration and who allege state created wrongful dis-
charge claims, an alternative avenue of dispute resolution. This decision is a
major reversal of law in an area that previously attempted to minimize state
involvement.
Michael J. Fortunato
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